The China Question in Zambia’s Digital Development: the Case of the Smart Zambia Project
Hangwei Li
Zambia’s China debate is often framed as a binary: either Lusaka is being a puppet of the West or it is drifting too close to Beijing, as public fears that its long-held foreign policy of non-alignment could be undermined amid rising geopolitical rivalry. The reality, as I found through my fieldwork and interviews with both Zambian policymakers and Chinese companies, is more layered.
Over the years, Zambia has tried to diversify its economic partnerships to reduce its reliance on traditional partners and the copper industry, at least rhetorically. Yet, in the digital and telecommunications sector, it is quite obvious that the country has developed a dependency on Chinese technology, experts, firms, and standards. Of course, when talking about China, we must bear in mind that “China” is not a monolithic actor. Huawei, ZTE, and StarTimes compete fiercely, at times even lobbying ministries in Zambia to revisit one another’s contracts. These were complaints I heard repeatedly during my years of fieldwork in Zambia.
To better capture the nuance on the ground, a more useful question than “China or the West?” might be whether political change at home, especially since the August 2021 transition, has altered how Zambian actors negotiate, implement, and, when necessary, unwind Chinese-backed digital projects.
Huawei’s role in the Smart Zambia Project provides a clear window into this question, as the project, or the evolution of the project, can help us reflect how political change in the country might influence the outcomes of Chinese digital projects.
Championed during Lungu’s term, the project was signed in March 2015 through a concessional loan agreement between the Government of Zambia and the Export-Import Bank of China. Huawei was awarded as the main contractor. The phase I (worth over $65 million) of the project involved building a national data centre and an ICT talent training centre; Phase II (valued $333.2 million) focused on expanding the national broadband network and implementing e-government services, which involved deploying fiber optic cable, connecting businesses and households, and building a national data center.
Scholars contend that the Patriotic Front-led government exhibited a trend of democratic backsliding and growing authoritarianism. For this specific project (and other large infrastructure projects), presidential directives carried significant weight. Accordingly, the Smart Zambia project was signed quickly without proper parliamentary and public debates. The process was controversial too. For instance, the Zambia Public Procurement Authority (ZPPA) was brought in only after contract signing to retroactively approve the decision. The contract itself also lacked clear delivery timelines and installation schedules. As for the cost of the project, a number of my informants also believed Huawei’s proposed costs were inflated.
The new government under President Hichilema brought some changes in the country’s digital landscape. Facing a 2020 default and IMF debt-distress warnings, the United Party for National Development (UPND)-led government reviewed big, externally financed projects. The Smart Zambia Project Phase II was ultimately cancelled in 2022. And there is also how the story gets more complicated. Technocrats in the Ministry of Finance and elsewhere pushed for tougher cost-risk analysis, questioned surveillance-heavy expansions, and pressed for better terms in talks with Chinese partners. Such a move has certainly demonstrated a level of agency and state capacity. However, scholars also note that under Hichilema, political survival often takes precedence. Since assuming office in August 2021, Hichilema has executed a comprehensive reshuffle of Zambia’s ministerial and permanent secretary positions, which also affected key institutions that are involved in the country’s digital development, including the Ministry of Information and Media, the Smart Zambia Institute and the Ministry of Technology and Science. Many newly appointed civil servants admitted to lacking historical knowledge of Smart Zambia. During my fieldwork in Zambia in August and December 2023, bureaucrats in these ministries shared common struggles such as inadequate project documentation and poor inter-ministerial knowledge transfer, which poses a serious obstacle to policy continuity and oversight. Several of my informants suggest the administration could have done more to tap officials with experience dealing with Chinese digital vendors and to assess benefits and risks more rigorously. Yet many of the very bureaucrats who had accumulated that expertise were removed or replaced, weakening institutional memory just when it was most needed.
Thus, the “China question” is also a Zambia question. Chinese digital projects do not arrive fully formed; they are negotiated, adapted, and implemented through a dialogical process shaped by Zambian choices, capacity and agency. For observers seeking nuance, that means tracking both sides and a variety of actors to capture a more balanced view. It also requires a long-term perspective, including revisiting the same sites over time. As the Smart Zambia Project shows, much has changed since Lungu first signed the deal. Even under Hichilema, debates continue over how to proceed with the Smart Zambia project in the long-term, especially given limited finances, competing priorities, vendor lock-in and rising geopolitical competition both globally and within the country. But in any case, Zambia’s drive to digitize is unlikely to stop.