Huawei: Helping or Hindering African Countries Secure Their Data Sovereignty?
Mandira Bagwandeen
As Africa rapidly digitizes, data sovereignty has become a key issue. Several African countries are investing in developing local data centers to reduce their dependence on foreign states, notably the US and Europe, for processing and storing data, and mitigating data colonialism. Huawei, China’s ICT giant, has positioned itself as a key player in Africa’s data center market; its representatives have, on several occasions, publicly advocated the company’s willingness to help African countries achieve data sovereignty and, in turn, digital sovereignty.1
Although much of the Global North – specifically the US and its allies – have banned or reduced Huawei operations in their countries because of national security concerns and have encouraged other countries to follow suit, African nations continue to ignore calls for caution, placing trust in the company. As such, Huawei continues to grow and expand its reach across Africa; it has relationships with over 25 African countries and has secured several data center projects across the continent over the last decade, and it intends to increase its data center (and cybersecurity) investments in the region with an earmarked investment of over $300 million by the end of 2026.2
Like China’s state-centric approach to digital sovereignty, many African countries often draw a parallel between digital sovereignty and data localization, believing that to exercise digital sovereignty, greater control over data, ICT infrastructure, and all data-processing activities must occur within territorial borders. As such, data centers are sprouting across the continent, with 700 new facilities expected to be built over the next decade.3 Data localization “is envisioned as a means for African governments to maintain control over critical data and data infrastructure, such as data centers, with some countries [such as South Africa] designating them as critical information infrastructure to be protected as strategic national assets.”4 The conflation of digital sovereignty with data localization is due to governments seeking to assert the state as the arbiter of digital and cyber governance. Although data localization is considered a means to ensure data sovereignty, it isn’t easy to achieve in Africa because of the enormous financial investments, technical capacity required, and access to reliable electricity supply needed to build and deploy data centers.5 Given these challenges, many African governments look to international companies and financial institutions to help with data center construction.
Chinese companies, notably Huawei, have made significant inroads into Africa’s data center market, which, largely untapped, presents massive investment opportunities.6 Huawei built-data centers are popular in Africa because the company usually “promises major commercial benefits to prospective customers” and “usually packages the delivery of hard infrastructure with services, and harnesses financing from Chinese policy banks [usually China EximBank and China Development Bank] to sweeten offers.”7
In June 2021, Senegal was the first African country to replicate China’s data governance model, which requires all servers to be housed within the country’s borders.8 The $18.2 million Diamniadio National Datacenter (DND), commissioned by the Senegalese government, financed with a loan from China EximBank and built by Huawei, is explicitly linked to “guaranteeing Senegalese digital sovereignty”.9 Following the establishment of DND, President Macky Sall instructed his government to migrate all state data and digital platforms to the new data center and repatriate all national data hosted outside Senegal.10 Senegalese state representatives have equated the development of the data center with helping their country achieve digital sovereignty. Cheikh Bakhoum, the director of Sénégal Numérique, believes that this data center allows his country to “better control its destiny and to definitively resolve the issue of its digital sovereignty.”11 In addition to Senegal, new Huawei-built data centers have been established or are in the process of being developed in other African countries, including (but not limited to) Zimbabwe, Tanzania, South Africa, Mozambique, Nigeria, Ghana, Egypt, Kenya, and Cameroon.
Huawei’s expansive presence in Africa’s ICT sector and uptake of data center developments in the region raises questions about how secure are African customers’ data sovereignty and whether African countries are compromising their national security by adopting Huawei ICT solutions and products. With Huawei (along with many other Chinese ICT companies) having ties to the Chinese Communist Party, there are fears (especially in Western quarters) that Beijing can leverage Chinese-built ICT projects (such as data centers) to spy on national governments and covertly gather intelligence.12 With sporadic incidents of Chinese cyberspying and cyber espionage targeting the African Union (AU) and the Kenyan government in recent years, it seems that Chinese ICT companies can be used as Trojan horses for Beijing to set up backdoors for cyberespionage, threatening African countries’ national security.13 Of course, China is not the only cyber espionage perpetrator; many others, such as the US intelligence services, have accessed sensitive national data around the world and the data of millions of people, of which Africans have not been exempt.14
As Africa continues to rely on foreign companies – whether Huawei or others – for ICT developments, especially for data-related infrastructure and services, there will always be concern about potential national cybersecurity breaches by foreign entities. Essentially, until African countries can develop the technological skills and capabilities, craft robust and comprehensive data regulations (informed by local socio-economic context), and secure the financial resources for local ICT development, achieving absolute data sovereignty for most African countries will remain a pipe dream.
References
1 Smit, S.(2022, March 28). Government data must stay in South Africa, says state technology executive. Mail & Guardian. https://mg.co.za/news/2022-03-28- government-data-must-stay-in-south-africa-says-state-technology-executive/
2 Nyabiage, J. (2021, June 28). African nations continue to put trust in Huawei for data management. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3138917/african-nations-continue-put-trust-huawei-data-management
Lima, J.M. (2021, December 20). Huawei lines up for Africa data center expansion. The Tech Capital. https://thetechcapital.com/huawei-lines-up-for-africa-datacenter-expansion/
Garowe Online. (2023, March 04). Chinese tech giant to invest over $300 million in Africa’s data and cyber security market.https://www.garoweonline.com/en/featured/business-n/chinese-tech-giant-to-invest-over-300-million-in-africa-s-data-center-and-cyber-security-market
3 Nyabiage, J. (2021, December 26). China promotes ‘digital silk road’ as solution to Africa’s data needs. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/ china/diplomacy/article/3160525/china-promotes-digital-silk-road-solution-africas-data-needs
4 Motolani Peltola, Tampere University, Finland, Cited by: Folashade, S. ( 2023). Motolani Peltola: The pursuit of digital sovereignty and local data ownership has implications for local capacity development. Blavatnik School of Government, Global Economic Governance Programme, University of Oxford. https://www.geg.ox.ac.uk/content/motolani-peltola-pursuit-digital-sovereignty-and-local-data-ownership-has-implications
5 Folashade, S. (2024, June 25). Digital Sovereignty in Africa: Moving Beyond Local Data Ownership. Centre for International Governance Innovation. https://www.cigionline.org/publications/digital-sovereignty-in-africa-moving-beyond-local-data-ownership/
6 Gopaldas, R. (2022, April 03). Data sovereignty is key. Good Governance Africa. https://gga.org/data-sovereignty-is-key/
7 Henry Tugendhat, US Institute for Peace, Washington D.C., Cited by: Nyabiage, J. (2021, June 28). African nations continue to put trust in Huawei for data management. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/ news/china/diplomacy/article/3138917/african-nations-continue-put-trust-huawei-data-management
8 Folashade, S. (2024, June 25). Digital Sovereignty in Africa: Moving Beyond Local Data Ownership. Centre for International Governance Innovation. https://www.cigionline.org/publications/digital-sovereignty-in-africa-moving-beyond-local-data-ownership/
9 Swinhoe, D. (2021, June 23). Senegal to migrate all government data and applications to new government data center. Data Center Dynamics. http://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/senegal-to-migrate-all-government-data-and-applications-to-new-government-data-center/
10 Ibid.
11 Cheikh Bakhoum, Director General of Senegal Numérique, Senegal, Cited by: Folashade, S. (2023). Cheikh Bakhoum, Sénégal Numérique: “Geopolitical rivalries in the digital sector could foster positive competition for Africa.” Blavatnik School of Government, Global Economic Governance Programme, University of Oxford. https://www.geg.ox.ac.uk/content/cheikh-bakhoum-senegal-numerique-geopolitical-rivalries-digital-sector-could-foster
12 Gopani, A.(2021, December 16). Questioning The Future of Africa’s Digital Sovereignty, Powered By China. Analytics India Mag. https://analyticsindiamag. com/questioning-the-future-of-africas-digital-sovereignty-powered-by-china/
13 Bagwandeen, M. (2023).The China Factor in Africa’s Pursuit of Digital Sovereignty. The African Governance Papers, 1(3): 108-135 (123).
14 Folashade, S. (2024, June 25). Digital Sovereignty in Africa: Moving Beyond Local Data Ownership. Centre for International Governance Innovation. https://www.cigionline.org/publications/digital-sovereignty-in-africa-moving-beyond-local-data-ownership/Bagwandeen, M. (2023).The China Factor in Africa’s Pursuit of Digital Sovereignty. The African Governance Papers, 1(3): 108-135 (123).